RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE REFORMED EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY by C. CAFIERO et al.
Risk and Crisis Management in the Reformed
European Agricultural Policy
Carlo Cafiero,1 Fabian Capitanio,2 Antonio Cioffi3
and Adele Coppola4
1Assistant Professor, 2Research Associate, 3Professor, and 4Associate Professor,
Department of Agricultural Economics and Policy, University of Naples Federico II, via
Universita` 96, 80055, Portici NA, Italy (Corresponding author: Carlo Cafiero (phone:
+39-081-2539058; fax: +39-081-7755143; e-mail: cafiero@unina.it)).
Currently there is ample discussion among EU Institutions (European Commission, European Parlia-
ment, and Member States’ governments) on the opportunity for setting up a comprehensive EU-wide
framework on risk and crises in agriculture. In the meantime, within the limits of the WTO rules on
agriculture, national governments are allowed to intervene through direct compensation to farmers in
case of exceptional events that cause damages to farming operations and through subsidies to crop
insurance programs. Such schemes are quite expensive for domestic budgets and some Member States
are trying to switch some of their cost to the Community’s budget, although an expansion of financial
resources devoted to agriculture in Europe is rather unlikely. Moving from the recently emanated pro-
posal of the European Commission, this paper discusses the main issues related to public intervention
for risk and crises management in agriculture.
Actuellement, les institutions europe´ennes (Commission europe´enne, Parlement europe´en et gouverne-
ments des pays membres) discutent intense´ment de l’opportunite´ d’e´laborer un cadre ge´ne´ral pour
l’ensemble de l’Union europe´enne sur les crises et les risques dans le secteur agricole. Entre-temps, selon
les re`gles de l’OMC sur l’agriculture, les gouvernements nationaux peuvent intervenir en accordant des
compensations financie`res directes aux agriculteurs en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles causant
des dommages aux exploitations agricoles ainsi que des subventions aux programmes d’assurance
re´colte. Ces interventions amputent conside´rablement les budgets nationaux, et certains pays membres
tentent de transfe´rer une partie de leurs couˆts au budget de l’Union europe´enne, bien qu’il soit peu
probable que les ressources financie`res consacre´es a` l’agriculture en Europe augmentent. A la lumie`re
de la re´cente proposition de la Commission europe´enne, le pre´sent article traite des principaux the`mes
lie´s a` l’intervention publique dans la gestion des risques et des crises dans le secteur agricole.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2004, the European Commission set forth a document discussing the issue
of “Risk and Crisis Management in EU Agriculture.”1 The document is in response
to an explicit request from the EU Council at the end of the Italian presidency that
followed similar initiatives from Spain and Greece, all of whom brought the issue of risk
management in agriculture to the attention of the Community.2
The EUCommission document, together with a companion working document,3 set
forth three possible options for new policy instruments that could help farmers improve
their capability to manage risks and crises.4 The proposal suggests that the measures be
financed at no additional cost to the European budget, and encourages discussion among
all interested institutions (European Parliament, Council, and Member States).
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Overall, the tone of the document could be interpreted as a signal that the high and
increasing pressure on the European agricultural budget derived from the EU enlarge-
ment and other issues deemed more deserving than agriculture, make it very difficult for
agricultural risk management to become a relevant chapter of the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund. Nevertheless, the document has contributed to fuel the
debate about the justification of continued public support for European agriculture, in-
cluding the compatibility of the proposed measures with the constraints imposed by the
WTO agreement on agriculture, and by the European ruling on State Aids.
One of the characteristics of the debate is that the word “crisis” now receives more
emphasis than ever in the past within the discussion on agricultural policy. Both private
strategies and public policies are being discussed as pertaining to a context of “risk and
crisis” management.
While one may agree that there is a potential role for public involvement in the
management of both risks and crises in agriculture, the two concepts should be kept
distinct. Broadening the scope of the debate to discuss options that ought to tackle both
risks and crises has generated some confusion (as if there might be tools which can handle
both equally well). One of the goals of this paper is to point to the source and to highlight
the content of such confusion.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the options that have been advanced by the
European Commission, something that will be done at length in the last section of the
paper. To do so properly, however, the first two sections discuss the potential scope for
risk related policy in agriculture, and introduce the peculiar conditions of the European
Agricultural policy. The hope is to be able to contribute to informed academic and
political debates on the role and effects of risk-related policies.
POLICY FOR RISK AND CRISES MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE
Public policies aimed at dealing with risk in agriculture have been justified on several
grounds and can be designed to achieve one or more of the following objectives: (a) to
reduce the incidence of damages of a potentially costly event, (b) to mitigate the effects of
damages suffered by farmers, and (c) to increase the risk management ability of farmers.
The policies might be grouped correspondingly:
1. Ex ante policies, to reduce the incidence of damages of potentially dangerous event.
These are policies intended at directly modifying the extent of the damages poten-
tially caused by risky events (e.g., public investments or incentives for private invest-
ments in infrastructures—such as canals and drainage facilities—which reduce the
damages in case of a flood.) Such policies are justified essentially by precautionary
motives, and are advisable when the potential damage is very large or when the
required investments assume the character of public goods. Their cost can be then
transferred to farmers by imposing specific levies, such as it is the case for manda-
tory contributions to irrigation consortiums, or to the general population through
taxes.
2. Ex post policies, to mitigate the effect of damage suffered by farmers, by financial
transfers or other provisions intended at facilitating economic recovery, such as
deferring or reducing tax payments. These are fundamentally redistributive policies
that spread the cost of damage recovery over the general population through the
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE REFORMED EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 421
public budget. The cost of such policies is proportional to the lack of preventative
measures, a situation that occurs especially when the events are unpredictable, so
that no incentives existed for either private or public prevention.
3. Policies to increase the riskmanagement ability of farmers. These policies are usually
justified on efficiency grounds, and attempt to correct for various forms of market
failure. Depending on the risk management strategy that farmers might adopt,
governments might get involved in various ways.
(a) Where insurance is viable, the government may reduce the cost of market based
insurance (i) through subsidization of insurance premiums, (ii) by providing rein-
surance, (iii) by taking actions aimed at reducing transaction costs in the insurance
markets, such as certifying available information on yields, (iv) by providing in-
formation on the distribution of insurable events, (v) by increasing competition
in the supply of insurance services, and (vi) by providing insurance directly.
(b) The government may provide the legal and institutional environment for the
operation of markets for financial instruments such as futures, options, and other
derivatives.
(c) The government may reduce the cost for farmers to retain the risk, for example,
by subsidizing savings, by improving access to credit, by providing incentives to
storage, by providing better marketing infrastructures, etc.
(d) In general, the government may facilitating the flow of reliable information.
Some of these policies may compete with each other, while others might be complements.
In any case, their presence will alter incentives facing private agents and therefore poten-
tially affect their decisions. From the vantage of social welfare, several important aspects
need to be considered when designing and implementing these policies.
(1) The availability of public policies can induce unjustified private risk-taking behav-
ior. For example, when generous ex post disaster payments are anticipated, farmers
might make production decisions and investments that can be considered subop-
timal from a society’s point of view, such as locating their activity in risk prone
areas.
(2) The presence of public policies might crowd-out other equally efficient privately
available actions. The presence of subsidized crop insurance, for example, might
reduce the extent to which other private risk-reducing activities—such as crop
diversification—take place. The benefits of these policies, therefore, should be cor-
rectly evaluated in terms of the additional protection, if any, they allow when com-
pared to the otherwise available private instruments and of the distributional effects
due to the costs. Private agents will clearly prefer publicly provided risk-management
tools to private for equivalent benefits in terms of risk reduction. Therefore, the ques-
tion arises as to whether such distributional effects are justified.
(3) The presence of risk related public policies might have unintended consequences
such as negative environmental externalities (Roberts et al 2004).
(4) When public policies aim to increase farmers’ ability to manage risk by means of
market-based instruments, the competitive structure of such markets may strongly
affect both the extent to which risk can be reduced and the distributional effect of the
policies. In the vast literature on crop insurance, for example, very limited attention
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has been given to the actual structure of the insurance industry, which most authors
have assumed to be competitive.5
All these aspects make the assessment of the incidence of risk related policy par-
ticularly complicated. The difficulties are further increased by the problem the tools of
welfare economics are controversial when applied to risk policy.
Economic Analysis of the Consequences of Risk Exposure
Although often criticized, the most widely used framework for the analysis of economic
behavior under uncertainty is Expected Utility, and many policy prescriptions are either
implicitly or explicitly motivated by results of Expected Utility-based analyses. To clarify
the extent to which some of these prescriptions can be used for the welfare analysis of risk
and as a guide for policy making, we review the main lessons from the extensive literature
devoted to the topic.6
Three aspects particularly complicate risk analysis and have often been overlooked
in policy discussions on the role of risk in agriculture. First, the welfare effect of risk
depends on the entire distribution of outcomes, not just on the expected value or on
the combination of mean and variance (Hardaker 2000). The distribution of outcomes
matters because it has been convincingly demonstrated that preferences toward monetary
outcomes are not symmetric, in the sense that the attitude toward losses does not mirror
that toward gains, and that loss-avoidance might often be a better description of the
objective of economic agents (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). To the extent that welfare
analysis has to be based on preferences, this asymmetry must be recognized, implying
that simple measures of expected costs and benefits are insufficient to properly assess
welfare changes. Especially where the distribution of outcomes is very skewed, such as
when low probabilities of very serious losses exist, also mean-variance approaches may
lead to serious underestimates of the potential social benefits associated with eliminating
just the lower tail of the distribution.
Second, from a utility-based point of view, what matters is the stability of consump-
tion, not of current income. Since the development of the life cycle and permanent income
hypotheses (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954), theory and evidence suggest that consump-
tion is positively related to the expected value of the long-term wealth, not to current
income. Changes in current income will have a significant welfare impact only in so far
as they are deemed to be permanent (Friedman 1957). This aspect leads to the need to
consider the role of saving and borrowing as means to smooth consumption. When credit
is feasible, a transitory negative change in income will entail a much lower change in
current consumption, given that the burden can be spread over the time span needed to
repay the amount of money borrowed to face the emergency. Unless the reduction is very
large and/or the interest rate is very high, the welfare cost of transitory changes in income
is quite low for any reasonable degree of risk aversion. Therefore, unless income reduc-
tions are deemed persistent, or no opportunities to save or to borrow exist, the welfare
benefit of eliminating transitory variations in income are very limited, which might con-
tribute to explain, for example, the limited demand for insurance of some weather-related
agricultural risks.
The third often-neglected aspect of the welfare analysis of risk in agriculture is that,
even in developed economies, the relevant consumption decision unit is the household,
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE REFORMED EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 423
whose income generating potential depends on all of its available resources. Even for
specialized farms, off-farm employment, andother financial activities, such as investments
in equities and bonds, compete with the agricultural activity for the use of the households’
resources. Farming and its exposure to risk should, therefore, be analyzed as part of the
wider farmers’ portfolio of activities and the possibility of reducing farm-related risk
through public policies should be evaluated in so far as it contributes to the reduction of
the overall risk of the entire agricultural household’s enterprise.
All these considerations contribute to fuel the belief that much of the emphasis on
normal production and market risk in agriculture is probably misplaced. In developed
countries, it is difficult to conceive of conditions for which the real welfare cost in terms of
normal enterprise risk exposure is truly relevant. At least for production and market risk,
private mechanisms ought to be able to efficiently take on the responsibility of reducing
the economic cost to farmers. Once the effects of possible private actions are taken into
consideration, the scope for truly welfare-enhancing public actions related to risk is likely
going to be limited to the creation of the needed institutional environment that allows
the efficient operation of the needed markets. In particular, facilitating the collection,
certification, and spread of reliable information appears crucial.
The question remains of how to tackle those rare and serious events whose conse-
quences are beyond the capability of the risk-sharing potential of markets, which will be
the topic in next section.
Risks versus Crises in Agriculture
According to the definition of crisis that the European Commission has adopted in its
document (EC COM (2005) 74) (Commission of the European Communities 2005b),
three conditions qualify for an event to be considered as conducive to a crisis: that it is
unforeseen, that it exceeds the individual capacity to cope, and that it affects a large number
of producers. By their very definition, there is nothing that can be done by individual
farmers to cope with this type of events, and the only hope for avoiding bankruptcy is to
count on some form of public support when the unforeseen event materializes.
From society’s point of view, therefore, the question is how to provide the needed
assistance at an acceptable cost, and one way to reduce the cost associated to crises
management is to invest in actions that might either increase the predictability of the
events, or reduce the extent of possible damages, thus transforming potential “crises” in
manageable “risks.”
Once a crisis hits, the only conceivable option is to try and limit the potential addi-
tional damages and to invest in restoration of the damaged structures. Nevertheless, the
event might inform decision makers of the probability that similar events might occur in
the future, and therefore it will help in assessing the worthiness of investing in preventative
measures. Further, the event may contribute to the development of new mechanisms to
share their cost, recent examples of which are catastrophic bonds, catastrophic reinsur-
ance, and reinsurance sidecars.
The previous argument is very general, and applies to any economic sector. Agri-
culture however, due to its close relation to food production, presents some implications
that need to be examined in detail. One element to consider, for example, is that the
consequences of external events or “crises” as defined above, that may affect the demand
of food products such as, for example, the BSE, or the more recent avian flu outbreak.
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The price drop that has followed these outbreaks, for example, could neither have been
predicted nor hedged against, even with an active trade of futures and options for beef,
poultry, or eggs, and it is very unlikely that any insurance company could have predicted
such events and developed viable contracts before they occurred. On the contrary, it is
conceivable that the occurrence of events such those would have negative consequences
even on existing insurance schemes: one example of such occurrences is provided by the
U.S. Livestock Risk Protection program administered by the RMA, which was suspended
following the detection of the BSE in the state of Washington in December 2003.
The outbreak of disease is a very serious problem for agriculture, especially for live-
stock production, given the strict link between agricultural products and food and the
precautionary attitude that, rightfully, everybody takes when choosing what to eat. As
demonstrated by the recent avian flu panic that spread across Europe, the potentially
excessive reaction of consumers can truly pose serious problems to the viability of agri-
cultural holdings. Given farmers have no control over these demand shocks, there is a
legitimate role for public intervention to bail out farmers from a crisis they did not con-
tribute to cause. In this sense, however, rather than sit and wait for the next crisis to
spread, Governments and farmers have plenty to do in addressing the real causes of the
persistence of the economic crisis that follows, for example, the outbreak of a livestock
epidemic. Often the major cause of the drop in demand is to be found in the difficulty
that consumers have in assessing the actual health risk associated with the consumption
of the involved products. Health risk, in fact, is the result of many factors that define the
risk generating process (see Metcalfe et al 2002), which include contamination, exposure
and dose–response. All these factors interact in a possibly complex way to determine the
actual risk function. Consumers may not be in the position to correctly assess the risk and
therefore, for precautionary motives, the only option for them is to diversify consumption
away from the involved products. Communicating reliable information on the actual risk
involved and on possible private actions that consumers could engage in to reduce the
overall individual health risk, might prove a much more cost-effective policy in sustaining
farmers’ incomes than any direct transfer of money.
Very different is the case of potential new crises to which agriculture is exposed
to because of events that manifest in the wider environment that surrounds farming,
such as environmental degradation, oil depletion, climate change, diffusion of genetically
modified organisms, terrorism, and so on. It is true that the occurrence of these events
pose questions to agricultural policy makers that they have never been called to analyze
before, and it is therefore legitimate to ask if and how the public ought to intervene, while
guaranteeing a fair balance between farmers’ responsibilities and those of the society at
large. However, to discuss of these events and of their potential impacts on the society
requires attention to the complex role that agriculture plays within modern societies.
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM AND RISK
It is likely that the recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will leave
European farmers more directly exposed to output price fluctuations. However, to con-
clude that the relevant risk for farmers has necessarily increased, implying that farmers’
welfare is certainly reduced, would be wrong, given that private tools to hedge price risk
exist and will likely be used.
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But there is another, stronger, argument to respond to those who claim that the
CAP reform will increase farm risk. The likely increase in the variability of agricultural
prices, in fact, does not necessarily imply riskier prospects for European farmers, because
the relevant definition of risk must consider both variability and level of the economic
outcome. In the spirit of the recent CAP reform, the (possible) drop of prices is coupled
to the introduction of the (certain, although temporary) single farm payments (SFP); this
means that total farm revenue, which includes the SFP, will not be reduced, on average,
whereas the presence of a fixed payment will likely reduce its variance.
To highlight this latter point, let us call X 0 the prereform level of farm revenue.
After the implementation of the reform, farm revenue will be the sum of two components,
X1 = X + T, where X arises from production activities and T , with var(T) = 0, is the
direct transfer. If the direct transfer is decoupled and set at a level such that expected
revenue is unchanged, we have T = E(X 0) − E(X) and cov(T , X) = 0. Therefore,
var(X 1)= var(X). Howwill the variance of the revenue change after the reform?Defining
α as the size of the fixed transfer relative to the initial level of revenue, the postreform
revenue can be written as: X 1 = (1 − α)X 0 + T . For the variance of the ex post revenue
X 1 to be higher than the variance of the prereform revenue X 0, it must hence be that
var(X) > [1/(1 − α)2] var(X 0). In other words, the variance of the production-related
revenue after the reform can be sizably larger than before to compensate for the fact
that now part of the total revenue is fixed. Just to give an idea of what does this could
imply in practice, if the direct transfer were 10% of the prereform revenue, the variance of
the revenue from the production activities would have to increase by more than 23% (=
1/0.92) to make the overall variance in farm revenue higher than before the transfer. In
other words, the presence of a fixed payment allows the farmer to bear a higher variance
in the production-related component of the farm revenues, no matter how risk averse
(s)he might be. The larger the share of the single payment is of the entire income, the
higher the increase of variance due to prices that can be borne without implications on
the overall welfare.7
Thus, the view that the CAP reform per se is a cause of increased economic risk
for farmers cannot be sustained. It can be argued that the compensation granted by
the SFP will only last until 2013 and that it is slated to decline by 5% a year, or that
the way in which it is calculated will not fully compensate for the reduction in expected
incomes, but in such cases the criticisms should be oriented toward the ways in which the
compensatory payments are calculated and implemented.8 The decoupling of the support
neither directly nor necessarily implies that more risk is at stake.
Two further arguments can be advanced to reinforce the conclusion that risk is not
going to increase in the postreform conditions: first, farmers might engage in production
patterns that grant higher average returns compared to the prereform cropping patterns,
and higher average returns will reduce the welfare incidence of negative price variations.
Second, many commonmarket organizations (CMOs) still include features that eliminate
the possibility that farmers’ incentive prices can fall below predetermined levels, thus
limiting the possibility that effective returns’ variancemight increase.9 If a new framework
for risk and crisis management must be conceived, it has little to do with the switch from
coupled to decoupled subsidies, and it must consider the entire set of sectoral and social
policies existing both at the Community and Member State levels, which might have a
large impact on farmers’ risk exposure, as we will see below.
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The Risk Reducing Effect of Existing Policies
For many years, several phenomena have been predominant in the European agriculture
that have been relevant for the overall variability of farm income: (1) yield variability, due
to weather conditions, was coupled with a steady increase of the average yields due to
technical and biological innovations, (2) relatively stable prices for most products were
also following an increasing trend, due to the functioning of CAP market interventions;
and (3) farmers have continued and increased their participation in gainful activities
outside agriculture, and new opportunities have arisen for income diversification even
within the farm (e.g., agro-tourism).
These conditions have strongly affected the development and use of agricultural risk
management tools in Europe, which have been mostly focused on those aimed at coping
with yield variability, namely, marketing excess production, technological innovation
and yield insurance, and have neglected price stabilization tools, such as use of futures
and forward contracts, options, and storage management, simply because they were not
needed. If one thing can be expected from the change of philosophy that has inspired the
recent CAP reform, it is that more and more private tools to manage price variation will
develop.
Under the reformed CAP, it is possible that price variation for some products shall
be somewhat higher than before, although this will likely not be the main concern.
Market stabilization was one of the founding objectives of the CAP and many CMOs
provided stabilization measures that work with different aims and ability to affect market
price movements. Such measures range from market intervention with a floor price to
instruments designed to smooth seasonality in prices movements, such as subsidies to
storage. In several CMOs there still are stabilization measures whose existence has not
been questioned during the process of reform, such as subsidies for private storage of
sugar, dairy products and cheeses, bovine and sheep meat, wine, including intervention
for distillation, and olive oil. Minimum intervention prices have been set at levels such
that they have not been deemed as representing implicit support. To have a sense of the
relevance of these measures, it can be considered that the EAGGF expenditure arising
from the private storage measures in 2003 amounted at €928 million, a figure that also
includes the budgetary outlays for table wine distillation.
In addition to measures included in the CMOs, farmers in several Member States
can also count on measures administered at the State level, specifically intended to
assist them to cope with income risk. The measures are quite diverse, ranging from
support funds to be called upon in case on natural disasters, to the payment of sub-
sidies to crop insurance premiums, to the administration of public crop insurance
schemes.
Other measures exist which do not belong to agricultural policy proper, but that
might have a non-negligible effect on farmers’ overall risk exposure. In Italy, for example,
the law that institutes the National Civil Protection Agency has recently been invoked to
restore damage suffered by farms in Lombardy due to the drought. The recent European
Solidarity Fund, instituted after floods plagued Central Europe in the summer of 2002,
although not intended to finance damages to crops, can be used for restoration of damages
to production structures.
Table 1 presents a list of the types of instruments that directly or indirectly contribute
to form the income safety net for European farmers.
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Table 1. Income safety net for European farmers
Private tools
Crop diversification and or crop/livestock combination
Crop insurance
Contract farming
Marketing
Hedging
Farm financial management
Income generating portfolio management
Savings/credit
Public policies
At local (regional) and/or State level
Sectoral
Subsidies to crop insurance
Public crop insurance
Agricultural solidarity funds
Other
General solidarity funds (civil protection)
At the European-wide level
Sectoral
Price support
Income transfers
Rural development initiatives
Other
European solidarity fund
The presence of such a wealth of tools poses a challenge in setting up a general
framework for risk management in Europe, in that it either needs to be compatible with
the existing national policies, which will likely lead to the definition of a very broad menu
including all different existing types of policies, or would require some of the Member
States to give up policies they already have in place. One other set of constraints on the
possible definition of new policies is represented by the existing institutional limits related
to WTO rules and to the discipline on State-aids.
WTO Rules
After the 1994 Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement (URAA), the degree of freedom
in agricultural policy choices has been considerably narrowed. Nowadays, the only new
policy measures that can be introduced are those included in the so called green box.
Much of the attention received by risk management policies in recent years, both in the
United States and in Europe, is arguably due to the introduction of two articles in the
URAA, which listed government financial participation in income insurance program
or income safety net and payments for relief from natural disaster among the types of
support exempted from the domestic support reduction commitments..
The eligibility criteria listed in the URAA are rather ample, in that compensations
of up to 70% are admitted for income losses of at least 30% of the preceding three
years’ average (articles 7 and 8 of Annex II). These criteria caused most existing disaster
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assistance and financial participation to crop insurance programs to be promptly rede-
fined to comply with these norms.
Concerning the possibility that such schemes will remain in the green box, evi-
dence so far suggests that the U.S. programs have had limited or no production en-
hancing effect, and therefore cannot be considered trade distorting (Smith et al 2003).
It is worth noticing, however, that, despite being not directly trade distorting, trans-
fers to U.S. cotton farmers channeled through crop insurance subsidies have been in-
cluded in the calculation of the production enhancing, total support granted to pro-
ducers in the context of the WTO cotton dispute raised by Brazil against the United
States in 2002. Although the WTO panel concluded that Brazil had failed to estab-
lish that crop insurance subsidies have a price suppressing effect, the question as to
whether crop insurance subsidies can be considered a form of production related sup-
port implies that how long their current levels of support will be acceptable is now in
question.
EU Discipline on State Aid in Agriculture
Additional constraints on risk-related policies come from the Community Guidelines for
state aid in the agriculture sector (EU OJ 2000/C 28/02), which allows both payments to
compensate for damages and subsidies to insurance premiums, provided that insurance
is intended to cover disaster-like risks.
In general, the discipline on state aids is rather generous in that it permits a wide
range of interventions intended to compensate damages due to “unforeseen occurrences
such as natural disasters, adverse weather conditions, or outbreaks of animal or plant
disease.” Adverse weather conditions such as frost, hail, ice, rain, or drought may be
assimilated to natural disasters once the level of damage reaches a certain threshold,
which has been fixed at 20% of normal production in the less-favored areas and 30% in
other areas.
It seems evident that the European discipline on state aids in agriculture has con-
tinued in the road opened by the URAA. This is a dangerous road if it will lead to
the mistaken impression that a temporary 30% reduction in gross income from a single
crop/product could generate such a welfare loss to require the intervention of public
financial support. The definition of a crisis from a farm perspective needs to be clarified,
and therefore, what might call for public support, is one or a combination of events that,
lacking external support, would cause current consumption, not current production or
income, to drop by 30% or more.
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S DOCUMENT OF MARCH 2005
With the preceding sections as a lengthy premise, we can now critically discuss the Eu-
ropean Commission’s proposal for the institution of a European framework for risk and
crisis management in agriculture. In March 9, 2005 the European Commission advanced
three possible options to be analyzed to the extent that they could “individually or jointly,
completely or partially replace Community and MS’s ad hoc emergency measures” (EC
COM (2005) 74) (Commission of the European Communities 2005b, p. 6). The three
options were described in very general terms, so that a precise assessment of their impli-
cations would require some speculation on possible ways in which the measures could
be implemented. The only strict requirement indicated by the Commission was that their
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implementation must be financed at most by the 1% point of the funds made available by
the modulation of CAP direct payments.
The three options were:
(1) Financial participation in farmers’ premium payments for insurance against natural
disasters;
(2) Supporting mutual funds; and
(3) Providing basic coverage against income crises.
In this section we shall briefly review the potential strength and weaknesses of the
three options, referring the interested reader to Cafiero et al (2005) for an extended
treatment.
Option 1: Financial Participation in Farmers’ Premium Payments
for Insurance Against Natural Disasters
According to the European Commission, “insurance provides an alternative to public
ex post compensation payments for losses caused by natural disasters at EU and national
or regional level” (EC COM (2005) 74) (Commission of the European Communities
2005b, p. 6, emphasis added). The idea is that, if a farmer buys insurance against natural
disasters, the damages covered by the insurance contract will not need to be compensated
ex post by public financial support.
While it is clear that increased use of insurance by farmers could contribute to a
reduction of the total amount of needed ex post compensation, it is not certain that public
contribution to premium payments is the most effective way to foster an enlargement of
such insurance market.
In this respect, other countries’ experience has been rather negative, and theU.S. case
is emblematic in this respect (Glauber 2004). The key issue is that, unless a government
is capable of a credible commitment to not compensate those who had not signed an
insurance contract, the farmers’ incentive to buy catastrophe insurance is very limited:
why spendmoney for coverage against events which are very rare and for which the public
is expected to step in with compensation? On the other hand, such a commitment, even
if theoretically possible, would hardly be politically sustainable, given that it would suffer
of a severe form of dynamic inconsistency. Once a disaster hits, those without insurance
coverage would also be those more in need of public assistance: to refuse to provide it,
would be a very costly political decision for any government. InEurope, where agricultural
national solidarity funds are in place, such as in Italy and in France, governments have
been rather generous in declaring the status of agricultural natural disaster.
Apart from the competition of public solidarity, insurance against damages caused
by natural disaster suffers from a series of other problems that have long hindered its dif-
fusion. Natural disasters have the character of catastrophic/systemic risks and therefore
are notably difficult to insure: it would require either holding large reserves, with result-
ing high opportunity costs of the immobilized capital, or buying expensive reinsurance.
Reinsurance could allow the transfer of part of the systematic risk to other companies
not bearing risks in the area in which the primary insurer operates. However, even when
reinsurance is possible, systemic risk can still be a cause of failure for market insurance.
Publicly supported reinsurance has been implemented for insurance of personal and prop-
erty damages due to catastrophes in France and in Spain (which however does not cover
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production damages) and for regular crop insurance in Spain and in the United States.
Such policies, however, appear to be very expensive if compared to their effect in terms of
reducing the need for ad hoc budget appropriations.
The combination of insurance and reinsurance subsidies implies a very high burden
on taxpayers. It appears that the risk of a similar occurrence has been duly acknowledged
by the European Commission, who advance the possibility that the encouragement of
national reinsurance schemes could also be examined as an alternative, and not as a
complement, to the subsidization of insurance premiums.
When considering subsidizing insurance premiums, one also must consider the com-
petitive structure of the supply of insurance. If monopoly power exists on the supply side,
subsidizing the premium paid by buyers might only have the effect of raising the prevail-
ing premium with limited effect on wider market participation, and therefore no benefit
in terms of farmers’ reduced exposure. Although this aspect has been only explored in
the literature to a very limited extent (Capitanio and Cafiero 2006) some anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the presence of local cartels among insurance companies might be a
concern.10
Given the various problems that may afflict disaster insurance, it becomes crucial
to develop well-designed mechanisms to prevent inefficiencies in the implementation of
schemes based on the payment of premium subsidies. TheEuropeanCommission provides
some guidelines regarding possible implementation, such as,
(1) That the amount granted per farmer by the combined EU and national support
should not exceed 50% of the total premium cost;
(2) To trigger payment, production losses should exceed 30% of the average agricultural
production;
(3) Total compensation granted to an individual farmer should never exceed 100% of
the loss when other forms of public compensation are in place; and
(4) The payment should not require or specify the type or quantity of future production.
Regarding condition (1), it must be noted how it could create discrepancies with existing
national programs that comply with EU state-aid regulations in agriculture, which allow
subsidies to premiums of up to 80%. It is very likely that if a proposal such as the
one described here will be approved, state-aids regulations, as well as existing national
legislations, will have to be emended to comply with the stricter limit of 50% of the
premium.
Conditions (2) and (3) are the elusive, because of the potential ambiguity on the
possible interpretation of the trigger level. If the 30% loss trigger level is interpreted as
being effective at the individual farm level, it might cause a number of problems. First,
the way in which it is formulated, it is not really a deductible, in the sense that, once the
payment is triggered, it is still possible to fully compensate the damage. Such a contractual
clause, rather than reducing the occurrence of moral hazard, will likely exacerbate it. In
fact, such a mechanism would create strong incentives for the insured to engage in hidden
actions that could bring damages of, say, 20–25% of production up to the trigger level of
30%, with the result that the increased monitoring costs might erode part of the benefits
of the subsidy. Second, it is not clear whether production should be intended in physical
terms or in value, and whether it must be intended with reference to a single crop/product
or to the entire farm production. Defining the loss in terms of physical production of a
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single cropwouldmake the proposedmeasures not substantially different from traditional
agricultural yield crop insurance, for which the long and varied history of governmental
support programs across the world leads to the conclusion that the only beneficiaries have
been “(1) those who were landowners at time of program introduction, who can benefit
from the increase in land prices; (2) insurance providers, especially if oligopolistic; (3)
politicians who work for them; and (4) economists who work for 2 or 3 above by making
programs appear to be good or at least defensible policy” (Wright 2006).
A more defendable option would be to define the farm-level loss, caused by the
natural disaster for which the policy is written, in terms of the value of the affected
productions and tomeasure it relative to the average of the previous three years’ total farm
income (inclusive of fixed payments received under CAP provisions). Such a procedure
would have the advantage of being truly decoupled from production decisions; it would
take into account the possible effect of natural hedge (i.e., the negative correlation between
production and price) and would be close to linking the income fluctuation to the actual
welfare loss. The implementation of such a scheme, however, would require the setting
up of a reliable system of records of individual farm incomes, which might be costly,
although potentially fruitful. The availability of accurate time series data at the farm
level, in facts, could make premiums differentiation for each farm possible, with benefits
for the diffusion of insurance: premiums would reflect the risk carried by individual
farms and thus adverse selection would be reduced. However, this scheme would not
avoid the moral hazard problem, and claims for damages must be assessed for each
insured. In short, all these features would likely imply high administrative costs, and
the possibility of a viable insurance scheme at farm level would be very difficult to
implement especially for countrieswhere good farm income information is not available or
reliable.
A third possible interpretation is that indemnity payments could be triggered by
an index of area production. The 30% income loss could be intended at a regional or
subregional level, and insurance contracts might pay indemnities only when an index
of regional production would fall below 70% of the three-year historic average. Such
an area-based insurance scheme could avoid moral hazard problems, in so far as no
individual farmer would have the potential to affect total regional production to the
point of triggering payment (Mahul 1999), although the problem remains of how to
calculate indemnities. One option is to indemnify all insured on a per hectare basis,
proportionally to the extent of the area production-fall. That is, if the area production
index falls at, say, 65% of historic average, full compensation means that all insured
would receive a payment equal to 35% of their historic individual average production,
independent of their actual production. This would avoid the cost of assessing individual
losses, but would imply the possibility that some farmers will be overcompensated and
other will not be fully compensated, due to the fact that individual production might not
be perfectly correlated to area production. The problemmight be dealt with by leaving the
possibility that individual farmers who suffered damages in excess of the average might
make a claim for an additional indemnity and will have to demonstrate the actual loss.
Such a scheme would be, in many respects, consistent with article 8 of the Annex 2 of
the URAA, according to which eligibility for ex post compensating payments arises only
when a formal recognition by government authorities exists that a natural or like disaster
has occurred or is occurring. The advantage of linking the recognition of a disaster
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occurring to an objective index of regional agricultural production, the determination
of which might be assigned to an independent authority, is that of limiting the extent of
the political failure due to the pressure to public authority to generous declarations of
disaster status.
To identify the possible financial burden that financial participation to the payment
of premiums would impose on the public budget, Cafiero et al (2005) estimated the
hypothetical cost of an area based farm revenue insurance scheme of the kind described
above for one Italian region. By projecting the results to other regions, their conclusion
was that supporting insurance on a large scale, given the EU budget constraint, would
require conspicuous integrations from national funds.
Taking into consideration the points raised in the previous section of the paper, the
main conclusions on the option of public subsidization to insurance premiums may be
summarized as follows.
(1) Privately provided insurance against natural disaster and other events with serious
consequences on the agricultural sector (such as economic crises) is known to be
difficult because of the systemic nature of the involved risk, in addition to the
informational problems that plague agricultural insurance.
(2) A subsidy to insurance premiumswill likely have very low transfer efficiency, because
part of the transfer would be dissipated in transaction costs linked to the possibility
of administering the insurance programs, and partly captured by rents to the extent
that insurance supply is not competitive.
(3) The relative efficiencyof a subsidywill depend crucially on thedesignof the insurance
contract. Area based triggers, which determine eligibility to indemnities based on
the level of an index of regional or subregional agricultural revenues would avoid
some of the problems involved with individual insurance schemes.
(4) The implementation of any feasible program of such agricultural revenue insurance
would require reliable time series data on crop revenues at the area level, something
that might be very costly.
(5) A subsidization scheme for an insurance against natural disasters would be very
costly, and financial resources from modulation would hardly be sufficient, even
with cofinancing from Member States.
Option 2: Supporting Mutual Funds
The second option advanced by the European Commission proposes supporting
a decreasing contribution to the administrative operation of mutual funds among
farmers.
Mutuality has played, and still plays, an important role within the agricultural sector.
It is an expression of solidarity among farmers that historically helped to build relevant
organizations, such as cooperatives, that contributed to the growth and stabilization of
family farming in Europe. Cooperatives and other forms of farmers’ associations have
been usually aimed at achieving more favorable distribution of power relationships within
the agricultural sector. In doing so, cooperatives, as well as producers’ organizations,
already provide risk management services to their members, by performing commercial
activities which reduce the effect of input and output price risk, such as by coordinating
the purchase of inputs and by providing marketing contractual arrangements, storage
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management, processing activities and other means to reduce the effects of output price
risk.
The same spirit could pervade the establishment and operation of mutual funds
with the specific aim of becoming risk management instruments for farmers. Traditional
mutual funds as insurance tools are based on the establishment of financial reserves, built
through participants’ contributions, which can be called upon by members in the event
of severe income losses, according to predefined rules. The basic idea, common to the
principle of insurance, is to spread the risk within a pool of members, with the additional
effect that, by implying long-term commitments, mutual funds would provide effective
risk pooling also over time.
To all intents and purposes, a mutual fund can be seen as a form of organized, joint
precautionary savings fund to be used to smooth incomes over time. As compared to
traditional insurance in agriculture, the scope for moral hazard is strongly limited by the
nature of the mutual agreement, where the participating group is bounded by a principle
of solidarity, and by the long-term nature of the commitment. The shared knowledge of
individual exposure to risk of participating farmers, on the other hand, would eliminate
adverse selection problems.
The effectiveness of a mutual fund depends on the accumulation of sufficient re-
serves on which farmers can count in case of income losses. The funds can be provided
by savings in the years in which farm returns are higher. However, reliance on the fund’s
capital could be hindered by the systemic character of the risk, especially if this option
must be seen as an instrument to reduce the need of ad hoc disaster assistance. When
severe and diffused damages are caused by adverse climatic events, a large number of
members of the mutual fund would be hurt, especially if the scope of the fund is limited
to the producer of a given product or to those residing in a given region. The systemic
character of risks can be particularly problematic at the beginning of a mutual fund’s
activity, when the gathered capital can be insufficient to cover losses incurred by many
participants at once. One possible solution to this problem can be publicly provided
reinsurance offered by a Member States, particularly at the beginning of the fund activ-
ities. Reinsurance could cover losses in excess of the fund’s accumulated capital, so that,
with the growth of the fund’s capital, reinsurance coverage might be gradually reduced.
No reinsurance would be necessary when the capital fund has reached the maximum
level.
A major problem for the institution of mutual funds could be the lack of sufficient
incentives to induce farmer’s participation, especially where tradition and experiences of
mutuality are poor. Mutual funds have to rely on trust among their members. Trust can
be considered as an externality produced by long-term relationships between members of
a Community. Nevertheless, incentives might be needed to motivate farmers in depositing
funds in the mutual fund rather than in personal savings account. The risk sharing
character of themutual fundmight not be a sufficient incentive, even if partially enhanced
by public reinsurance. A more effective incentive could be provided by a premium on the
interest rates earned on deposits made in the fund. The interest rates’ premium might
borne by the fund’smanagement and subsidized by local governments. Tax benefits for the
share of farm income invested in themutual fund could be an alternative or an integration
to interest rate subsidies. For example, a lower tax burden on deposits to the mutual funds
could be balanced by higher taxes when a member leaves the fund or when funds are
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withdrawn for purposes different than those for which the fund has been specifically set
up.
In addition to using internal reserves, a mutual fund could access credit in case
of necessity. To the extent that the fund’s members are able to jointly provide higher
guarantee to the lending institution, mutual funds could contribute to increase ac-
cess to and reducing the cost of credit relative to what individual member could
achieve.
In the discussion so far, the hypothesis has been maintained that the fund fully
retains the exposure to risk. However, the possibility of transferring part of the fund’s risk
exposure on others might greatly increase the risk management ability of mutual funds,
especially in the context of natural disaster risk management, when the potentially large
intensity of the damage is associated to the systemic nature of the risk. The transfer of
risk, as usual, might be achieved either by insurance or by securitization, for which the
presence of mutual funds might grant sizeable advantages relative to individual farmers’
action.
The fund might buy commercial insurance coverage against the risks that are more
likely to threaten a large number of its members. Compared to individually contracted
coverage, a mutual fund would have greater bargaining power when facing the insurance
companies (thus contributing to the reduction of some of the distributional inefficiency
linked to presence of insurance subsidies we mentioned in the previous section) and, by
internalizing monitoring costs, it could sensibly lower the premiums by, for example, ac-
cepting higher deductibles. There is ample evidence of such advantages from the Consorzi
di Difesa: provincial farmers associations established in Italy in 1974 for the management
of weather risk in agriculture. By negotiating the terms of collective insurance coverage,
theConsorzi have been often able to obtain lower premium rates and better coverage than
individual farmers (Melani 2005).
Another potential form of transferring the fund’s risk is securitization of the fund’s
exposure through specific contracts that could be sold on the over-the-countermarkets for
financial derivatives, much in the tradition of the already mentioned CAT-bonds. While
the potential for farmers to use financial markets to hedge their risk is very high, currently
the most relevant obstacles appear to be the minimum size needed to efficiently access
such markets and the professional skills required to profitably exploit them. Acquisition
of the professional abilities required to operate on the financial markets is probably
beyond a single farmer’s ability, and their risk exposure might not be sufficient to justify
securitization. In this sense, mutuality might be a very effective mean to justify both
the acquisition of the required professional services and to reach the critical dimension
needed for securitization.
Sectoral and/or regional mutual funds could play a fundamental role in collecting
individual member’s risks, packaging and placing them on the wider financial market by
means of insurance companies, brokers and other intermediaries. In this respect, other
forms of public support to farmers’ organizations with the objective of increasing their
hedging ability beyond that allowed for by traditional instruments, such as forward and
futures contracts, might be highly beneficial. They might take the form of:
- Creation of the institutional setting necessary for farmers’ organizations to operate
on the financial markets;
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- Financial contribution toward the creation of risk management units within existing
or newly formed producers’ associations; and
- Provision of required training opportunities.
For some sectors, the mutual risk management functions we are describing could
be easily integrated in the operation of existing producers’ organizations, such as those
recognized by Member States under the current fruit and vegetables CMO. The scope
of the Operational Programmes could be enlarged to include the financial activities
required to provide precautionary savings to be used as risk management tools. Other
sectors where producers share special risk management needs could be considered for the
creation of analogous producers’ organizations with the objective of performing mutual
risk management functions: one example is the wine sector, where price risk could be
easily hedged through use of appropriate financial derivatives. The establishment of an
EU-wide network of agricultural mutual funds working in this direction could become
the much needed stimulus to the development of a host of financial instruments suited to
the changing risk structure of EU agriculture, thus creating a more favorable environment
for agricultural risk management. Also, a revision of market stabilization policies defined
within the CMOs could help in this regard, by avoiding the crowding-out phenomena
that have hindered the establishment of market for risk transfer within the EU.
To summarize, the option of supporting the institution and operation of mutual
funds seems highly promising. The main strength of this option is the low financial cost
that it might impose on the EU budget. Indeed, the only fundamentally needed action
would be that of setting up the institutional framework to allow funds operation, while
the responsibility to provide financial incentives for farmers’ participation to the funds
could be assigned to local governments. In addition, the transfer efficiency of any financial
support from taxpayers to producers would be relatively high because it would be entail
making transfers directly to the farmers, with no intermediaries involved which could
capture some of the benefits.
In terms of WTO-compatibility, there appear to be no problems involved. The con-
ditions for institution and functioning of the fund can be written in ways that are fully
consistent with the prescription of the URAA, by stating, for example, that withdrawals
from the fund can be authorized after formal recognition by government authorities that
a serious disaster has occurred.
The main weakness of mutual funds as an instrument for risk management is their
dependence on the institutional setting required for their operation. The functionswe have
described, in fact, would require mutual funds to act as financial intermediaries, which
would usually require specific authorization by the competent governmental authority,
something that might be resisted by the lobby of other credit and finance operators.
Also, difficulties might be found in situations where the traditions in mutuality are ab-
sent or weak and where the competing role of other forms of public insurance against
income crises strongly reduces the need for mutual insurance as well as for other private
instruments (see, e.g., the Italian experience).
Option 3: Providing Basic Coverage Against Income Crisis
The third option put forward by the European Commission consists of a generalized
approach to manage income crisis in agriculture, as an alternative to other possible sector
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specific intervention. The proposal is to offer a general income safety net to all farmers,
thus improving the balance between different production sectors that today count on
different levels of protection. The only stated conditions for such programs are that any
such measure would be fully compatible with the prescriptions of article 7 of the Annex
2 to the URAA, so that it might be included in the WTO “green box.” The measure,
therefore, shall be open to all farmers facing gross income reductions of more than 30%
of the preceding three years’ average or of a three-year-based average of the preceding five
years, excluding higher and lower values, irrespective of type and quantity of production.
Compensation should amount at no more than 70% of the income loss, although it could
be combined with payments from other compensation programs up to 100% of the gross
income loss.
To guarantee fair competition across the Community, national programs developed
according this option will need to be carefully examined to ensure compatibility with
the regulations on state aids. The option opens several questions on both the motivation
and the way in which the proposed measures could be applied. Regarding motivations, a
first concern is raised by the general approach of income stabilization that the European
Commission is apparently willing to introduce with such an option. Generalization of
these payments would grant all EU agricultural producers access to income stabilization
measures. Currently, farmers who receive decoupled payments can count on a fixed
minimum income threshold even in case of a severe crisis. With implementation of this
option, producers who currently operate in sectors not sheltered by the presence of
decoupled direct payments could count on a form of farm income stabilization. As a
result, equity of the CAP would increase.
Producers that would benefit the most from measures defined by this option are
those who operate in sectors with the largest income variability (i.e., fruit and vegetables,
wine, pig meat), for which CMOs do not provide direct decoupled payments. This lack of
decoupled payments could imply the need for large amount of EU and national funds to
compensate income losses in these sectors, thus raising concerns on the extent to which
financial resources available from the modulation of direct payments might be sufficient.
It must be borne in mind that risk is an intrinsic component of business in these sec-
tors. Farmers operating in such activities must be capable of managing it. A widespread,
free, income safety net, such as the one envisaged under this option, could have strong dis-
torting effects: it would likely causemore resources to be used in the riskiest activities, thus
potentially generating negative effects in terms of larger supply, negative environmental
externalities and a waste of public resources.
The European Commission proposal of an EU-wide common coverage of large in-
come losses might also be motivated by the desire to avoid that national ad hoc disaster
legislation could create differences across farmers operating in different Member States.
An EU regulation on this issue, which would clearly state conditions for income stabi-
lization payments made by Member States and the maximum allowed amounts, could be
a relevant achievement, considering that such payments cannot be afforded by the EU
budget. However it seems impossible to avoid the fact that using national funds might
then create large discrepancies in the level of support received by farmers in different
countries, given different capacity of national budgets to finance such compensations.
The conditions that would allow income compensation under such general scheme
need to be specified. The European Commission staff working document (EC SEC (2005)
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320) (Commission of the European Communities 2005a) identifies three main causes
of crisis that should be managed on the basis of public funds: natural disasters and
catastrophes, sanitary crises and economic crises. While it is clear that the first two
are totally beyond farmers’ control and might have effects on the long-term viability
of agricultural holdings, and therefore appeal to public solidarity might be justified for
financial support, the case of economic crisis is substantially different.
The phrase “economic crisis” is rather general; it includes very different phenomena
having the effect of a large reduction of agricultural output prices, an increase of input
prices, or both. The time-span of these crises may be very different, in the sense that
some may be temporary, whereas others may become a stable feature of the economic
environment that characterizes farmer choices. For example, the increase of oil prices
reduced the profitability of farming, as well as of many other enterprises, but high oil
prices are likely to persist in the long term. To deal with such a change as if it was an
occasional risk can be ineffective and socially undesirable: it should rather be considered
as the signal of a change in the economic environment surrounding farm activity and
needs to be tackled with other instruments.
In other words, it would be wise and useful to distinguish between economic crises
involving permanent changes with consequences on farm viability, and crises with strong
but transitory effects. Long-lasting changes in the economic environment surrounding
farming ought to be dealt with more articulated interventions that promote structural
change and not through income transfers.
As for option 1, Cafiero et al (2005) estimated the foreseeable cost of implementing
this option, showing that even under very restrictive eligibility criteria, the budget costs
implied by this option could be huge. Therefore, it is quite difficult to imagine that this
option could ever be applied on a large scale. Moreover, the interests at stake might be
large and thus it is highly likely that eligibility to the payments will became largely a
matter of political bargain at local level.
Implying essentially direct income transfers to farmers, the transfer efficiency of
this option would be rather high, although possible rent seeking behavior on the part of
potential beneficiary might reduce some of the benefits to farmers. Once such a scheme is
in place, current administrative cost could be relatively low, although set up costs might be
quite high, given the need to determine an agreed upon accounting definition of income,
and reliable methods should put in place to calculate income and assess losses at the farm
level.
As for other generalized risk reduction measures, compensation of farm losses open
to all farmers might have strong distorting effects on resources allocation as well as
negative environmental effects. Releasing farmers from the burden associated with the
cost of risk attached to their choices, would likely generate externalities deriving from the
increased use of resources in riskier alternatives.
The setting up of a general income stabilization scheme, as allowed by the current
WTO rules, could be, in principle, a way to provide a solid safety net for farmers across
Europe.Although the transfer efficiencywould be high, given the direct nature of transfers
to farmers, the burden imposed on taxpayersmight be very heavy and different in different
Member States, thus becoming a cause for increased distance between the levels of support
granted to farmers in the various regions of Europe. Thiswould contrast with the cohesion
objectives that inform much of current European policy.
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In addition, by taking away any individual responsibility in risk management, an
intervention such as the direct income transfer envisaged by the European Commission
proposal might have strong negative consequences in terms of efficiency of resource
allocation.
Concluding Remarks on the Commission’s Document
The general conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the three options proposed
by the Commission is that it is quite difficult to imagine how any of the three could ever
succeed in completely avoiding the need for emergency measures in case of disasters, if,
as the document specifies, they must be financed by at most 1% point of the funds made
available by the modulation of CAP direct payments. According to EU sources, with full
implementation of modulation, 5% reduction of direct payments would amount at about
€1,200 million/year.11 If such an estimate proves correct, the prospected options can
count on approximately €240 million/year, a figure which is lower, for example, than the
€320 million/year that the Italian National Solidarity Fund alone has spent, on average,
in each of the last 20 years to compensate farmers for damages due to natural disasters
(Borriello 2003).
More reasonably, we can imagine that the three options, by promoting the adoption
of effective preventive actions by farmers, should be intended as means to contribute to a
reduction of the amount of financial resources eventually needed to face the emergencies
caused by agricultural crises. As such, they could be intended as part of a more com-
prehensive plan, possibly including a common EU policy on disaster relief legislations.
A uniform treatment of agricultural disaster compensation, in facts, could be desirable
to avoid different national approaches that could undermine competition among the EU
countries agriculture.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have presented a summary of the main theoretical aspects that should
inform the discussion on policies intended to manage risk and crises in agriculture in
the context of a developed economy, with a specific reference to the conditions of the
European Union and of the reformed Common Agricultural Policy.
Themain lessons we think can be drawn from all the preceding discussion on the pos-
sibility of setting up a comprehensive strategic framework for risk and crisis management
in agriculture are as follows.
The relevance of the risk factors and their potential effects on farmers’ welfare must
be well understood.
To assess their welfare consequences, and therefore the value of possible risk reducing
public policies, the various risks that farmers face must be measured against the potential
consequences on the levels of farm households’ consumption, not of current income. In
most cases consumption depends on the expected permanent level of total family income.
Such consideration would lead to the need to re-evaluate the welfare implications of
exposure of farming to such things as natural hazards or to market crises for specific
products, and therefore of the benefits associated with direct public intervention. Such
a preliminary analysis would recognize that there are risks which are most efficiently
managed by farmers’ either by diversification of income sources or by coping with the
consequences of limited income fluctuations through self insurance, without the need for
public support. On the opposite end, when predictability is so limited that no preventive
RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE REFORMED EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 439
action might be conceived and/or when the potential damages exceed farmers’ ability to
cope, there is no alternative to the reliance on some form of public solidarity.
An unambiguous distinction between normal enterprise risk and truly disastrous events
ought to be made. Farmers should retain the main responsibility for management of normal
enterprise risk and public action that tends to substitute for possible private action should
always be avoided.
The actions should be different in case of crises and of normal enterprise risks. For
crises:
(1) In the short-medium term, damage compensation is likely to be the only option;
(2) The responsibility of assessing conditions that trigger public transfers should be
delegated to an agency independent of the political authority;
(3) Only damages to farm assets should be directly compensated, whereas damages to
current production should be excluded;
(4) Compensation might be take the form of both direct transfer of money, and of
financial participation in interests payments on loans specifically intended at damage
recovery;
(5) In themedium–long term, preventive private actions should be supported that reduce
the possible extent of damages caused by natural disasters, for example, by providing
incentives to farmers to move from disaster prone areas, or to make investments in
protective infrastructures; and
(6) Direct public investment in protective infrastructures might be needed, too.
For normal enterprise risks, farmers should develop their own risk management
abilities, by making use of private markets of insurance, credit, and financial instruments.
In this case, public intervention should act in order to promote private market or to favor
the development of private abilities to manage risk, and not to substitute them.
Several actions can help in this direction:
(1) Providing the needed regulatory institutions and informational support in order to
promote the expression of the private demand for market-based risk management
tools, while guaranteeing competition on the supply side;
(2) Promoting the constitution of precautionary saving account through direct and
indirect incentives, such as fiscal benefits in order to increase the potential of self
insuring against some of the less severe risks at the individual farm level; and
(3) Promoting concentration of the demand for risk management instruments in order
to have a more efficient access to all of these markets. In this case, supporting
the operation of mutual funds is an effective way of fostering development of risk
markets. In addition, to improve efficiency in risk transferring, the concentration of
the demandwill also have the effect of internalizingmonitoring costs, thus increasing
the scope for mutual management of some of the risks which, by their nature, might
be difficult to transfer because of the presence of asymmetric information.
NOTES
1EC COM (2005) 74 (Commission of the European Communities 2005b).
2Reference is made to a memorandum submitted by the Spanish Presidency on March 18, 2002,
followed by the International Conference on “Agricultural insurance and income guarantees,” held
inMadrid onMay 13 and 14, 2002, and to the Greek Presidency memorandum on natural risks and
insurance in the agricultural sector which was submitted to the Council onMay 7, 2003, followed by
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the seminar held in Thessalonica on June 6, 2003, to examine possible responses to natural disasters
in the agricultural sector. It is worth noting that Spain, Greece, and Italy are the states where more
public money is spent in agriculture under the rubric of agricultural risk protection, and therefore
it is conceivable that the motivation for bringing the issue to the Union’s attention was the desire to
transfer part of the burden of their domestic agricultural production safety net onto the European
budget.
3EC SEC (2005) 320 (Commission of the European Communities 2005a).
4Financial participation in farmers’ premium payments for natural disaster insurance; supporting
mutual funds; and the provision of a basic coverage against income crises.
5In the Italian legislation on crop insurance for example, for a long time collusion between insurance
companies has been actually promoted, through operation of a mandatory consortium between
crop insurance companies. The rationale was that sharing actuarial information on agricultural
risks might have been used to better setting premiums. Less emphasis has been devoted to the
possibility that lack of competition on the supply of insurance might cause the extraction of surplus
and of all the potential benefits of premium subsidies. For some time, the danger that the presence
of premium subsidies would mostly benefit insurance companies has been avoided by promoting
the functioning of a counteracting monopsony, the ASNACODI (National Association among the
“Consorzi di difesa”), the farmers’ representative entity authorized to collect premium subsidies.
In 2001, this market-controlling device was dropped, authorizing the release of subsidies also to
insurance policy signed without the intervention of ASNACODI.
6Reference is made, in particular, to Moschini and Hennessy (2001) and Hardaker (2000).
7The point raised stands on the assumption that mean and variance are sufficient to define the
relevant aspects of the risky prospect, here agricultural income.
8In fact, it is not to be taken for granted that the SFP will be eliminated. As one referee pointed
out, there is already an active farm lobby in place in Europe that is concerned with the reduction
of the SFP.
9Examples are the provisions of the beef and veal CMO, of the poultry and eggs CMO, which
have been recently applied for example following the BSE, foot-and-mouth disease, and avian flu
outbreaks, the mandatory distillation of excess production of wine, the withdrawal mechanism for
fruit and vegetable, the subsidies to private storage for sugar and dairy products, and so on.
10In 1996, the Italian legislation that set conditions for subsidization of crop insurance was amended
(DPR 324/96), following EEC directive 42/92 on antitrust law, to ban the existing consortium
among agricultural insurance providers and to introduce a ceiling to the premiums entitled to
the subsidy, in the attempt to reduce the incentive for insurance companies to capture the rent
associatedwith the presence of the subsidy by increasingmarket rates. In 2004, the right of insurance
companies to form consortia of reinsurance of co-insurance has been restored. In the recent past,
the Associazione Nazionale delle Imprese Assicurative (ANIA) has been repeatedly challenged by
the Italian anti trust authority, and in two cases it has been convicted for anticompetitive behavior
in the delivery of mandatory car insurance.
11http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/infosheets/modul_en.pdf.
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